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Weighted voting games provide a simple model of decision-making in human societies
and multi-agent systems. Such games are described by a set of players, a list of players’
weights, and a quota; a coalition of the players is said to be winning if the total weight of
its members meets or exceeds the quota. The power of a player in a weighted voting game
is traditionally identiﬁed with her Shapley–Shubik index or her Banzhaf index, two classic
power measures that reﬂect the player’s marginal contribution under different coalition
formation scenarios. In this paper, we investigate by how much one can change a player’s
power, as measured by these indices, by modifying the quota. We give tight bounds on the
changes in the individual player’s power that can result from a change in quota. We then
describe an eﬃcient algorithm for determining whether there is a value of the quota that
makes a given player a dummy, i.e., reduces her power (as measured by both indices) to 0.
We also study how the choice of quota can affect the relative power of the players. Finally,
we investigate scenarios where one’s choice in setting the quota is constrained. We show
that optimally choosing between two values of the quota is complete for the complexity
class PP, which is believed to be signiﬁcantly more powerful than NP. On the other hand,
we empirically demonstrate that even small changes in quota can have a signiﬁcant effect
on a player’s power.
© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Cooperation and joint decision-making are key aspects of many interactions among self-interested agents. In such in-
teractions, the collaborating agents may have different preferences, so they need a method to agree on a common course
of action. One possible solution to this problem is to use a voting procedure, and select a plan that is supported by a
majority of voters. This approach to decision-making is very common in human societies and can be naturally extended to
multi-agent systems [12].
Under majority voting, all agents have the same power. However, treating all voters as equals is not always appropriate:
some of the agents may be more important for the task at hand than others, or contribute a larger amount of resources to
it. Similarly, in parliamentary voting, some of the legislators may represent a larger constituency, and therefore should be
given more inﬂuence over the ﬁnal outcome. This issue can be addressed by employing the machinery of weighted voting
games. In such games, each agent is associated with a nonnegative weight, and a subset (coalition) of agents is deemed to
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making process: more important voters are assigned a higher weight. The quota is typically set to be slightly greater than
half of the total weight, but other values of quota (e.g., 2/3 of the total weight) are quite common as well.
Even though weights are intended to model the agents’ relative importance, an agent’s ability to inﬂuence the group
decision is not always directly proportional to her weight. For example, if the quota is so high that the only winning
coalition is the one that involves all agents, each agent can veto the decision, and hence all agents have equal power. Thus,
to measure the power, instead of using agents’ weights, one typically employs one of the so-called power indices. Perhaps
the most prominent ones among them are the Shapley–Shubik index [41] and the Banzhaf index [11,6]. Intuitively, both
of these indices measure the probability that a given agent is critical to a forming coalition, i.e., that the coalition would
become winning if the agent joined in; the difference between these two power indices comes from different coalition
formation models. Besides measuring the apriori voting power, the power indices can be used to share the payoff obtained
by executing the task: a natural approach is to pay each agent in proportion to their voting power, i.e., their Shapley–Shubik
index or their Banzhaf index. Also, in politics, power indices provide very useful information to lobbyists who need to decide
how to allocate their contributions.
The importance of power indices makes them a natural target for manipulators, i.e., rogue parties that want to increase
or decrease the voting power of a certain agent.1 Now, accomplishing this goal by changing an agent’s weight may require
a substantial investment on the manipulator’s part, such as, e.g., recruiting additional supporters of a political party. In
contrast, it may be relatively easy to change the quota. Indeed, such changes are not unusual in political decision-making,
and can be explained by the desire to build a consensus (if the quota is increased) or simplify the passage of bills (if the
quota is decreased)—for instance, a recent move by Democratic members of the U.S. Senate to change the ﬁlibuster rules [22]
can be viewed as an attempt to change the quota. Therefore, the entity that determines the format of the decision-making
procedure (in what follows, we will refer to this entity as the central authority) might be able to change the quota without
encountering substantial resistance. However, this seemingly innocent change may have very different effects on different
voters, and therefore the central authority can use it to advance its own goals.
In some settings, the quota may have to be updated in response to other changes in the voting system, such as expansion
of the system to include new players (as was the case, for instance, when the European Union expanded from 15 to 27
member states) or changes to players’ weights (it is plausible that in the future the countries’ weights in the EU Council
may have to be updated to reﬂect the demographic changes). In such scenarios, the central authority would normally have
some freedom in setting the quota and may pursue a variety of objectives when doing so; for a discussion of this issue in
the context of European Union enlargement, see [28,30,32].
In this paper, we study the effect of quota changes on the agents’ power, as measured by the Shapley–Shubik power index
and by the Banzhaf power index. We ﬁrst provide tight bounds on the change in voter’s power that can be accomplished
by modifying the quota. It turns out that there are settings where all voters except for the one with the maximum weight
can have their voting power reduced to zero by an appropriate choice of the quota, i.e., the ratio between the voter’s power
before and after the change of quota can be unbounded; however, for both indices, we can obtain tight worst-case bounds
on the difference between the values of the index before and after the change.
Having established that changing the quota may have a very signiﬁcant effect on the agents’ power, we focus on the
algorithmic aspects of the manipulator’s problem. The manipulator may want to either minimize or maximize the target
player’s power. We limit our attention to the former problem. In this case, the best that the manipulator can hope for is to
make the target player a dummy, i.e., to ensure that this player’s power (as measured by both indices) is 0. We show that
the center can easily determine whether there is a quota value that accomplishes this. This result is somewhat surprising,
since checking if a given agent is a dummy for a ﬁxed value of the quota is well-known to be coNP-complete [37,10,35].
The ranking of the agents is sometimes more important than the exact power they possess: for instance, a party in
parliament may have a better negotiating position if it is among the top three most powerful players. Therefore, we also
study the problem of setting the quota so as to guarantee a particular relation (equality or inequality) between two agents’
power-index values. We demonstrate that as long as two agents have different weights, the quota can be selected so that
they have different voting power. A related issue that we consider is that of selecting the quota so as to ensure that all
agents with different weights have different power-index values. We exhibit a family of weight vectors for which essentially
any value of the quota has this property. In contrast, we show that if agents’ weights grow fast enough, this goal cannot be
achieved.
In many real-life settings, the center will only be able to change the quota by a relatively small amount, or choose among
a few acceptable quota values. It is therefore interesting to ask if the manipulator can achieve his goals when his ability
to change the quota is constrained. We provide a twofold answer to this question. First, we show that choosing the quota
optimally from a given set is likely to be hard. Speciﬁcally, we prove that the problem of deciding which of the two given
values of the quota is better for a particular agent is complete for the complexity class PP, which is believed to be more
powerful than NP. However, if the manipulator’s computational resources are not limited, he may be able to achieve his
1 In voting theory literature, the term “manipulation” is reserved for voters’ dishonest behavior, while the dishonest behavior by the election authorities
is usually referred to as “control”. However, in this paper we will use both terms interchangeably.
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quota by up to 20% may have a noticeable effect on agents’ power.
We remark that our work does not provide an algorithm for choosing a quota so as to maximize of minimize a given
player’s power. This question has been recently addressed by Zick et al. [43]; their paper builds on the conference version
of our work. Zick et al. focus on the Shapley–Shubik power index, and show that the power of a player can be maximized
by setting the quota to that player’s weight; in contrast, a slightly higher quota is quite likely to minimize this player’s
power. More precisely, if a player’s weight w is small relative to the weights of the other players, then w + 1 is often the
worst possible value of the quota for this player; on the other hand, if w is relatively large, the player’s power can often be
minimized by setting the quota to 1 (in which case all players have the same power). Zick et al. also show that checking
whether a given quota maximizes or minimizes a player’s power is NP-hard, and provide a polynomial-time algorithm for
deciding whether all players have equal power. Their results, together with the work presented in this paper, demonstrate
that changing the quota is a subtle, but effective way to alter the distribution of power in a weighted voting system.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After reviewing the related work in Section 1.1 and presenting the necessary
deﬁnitions in Section 2, in Section 3 we establish tight upper bounds on the changes in players’ power that can be achieved
by altering the quota. Section 4 describes an eﬃcient algorithm for checking if there is a choice of quota that turns a given
player into a dummy. Setting the quota so as to ensure that different players have different power is discussed in Section 5.
In Section 6, we analyze the complexity of comparing a player’s power for two different values of the quota. Section 7
presents our experimental results and Section 8 concludes.
1.1. Related work
A detailed study of many aspects of weighted voting games can be found in [20] and [42]. The Shapley value originated
in a seminal paper of Shapley [40], who considered how to fairly allocate the utility gained by the grand coalition in a
cooperative game. A subsequent paper of Shapley and Shubik [41] applied the Shapley value to weighted voting games,
so this value is referred to as the Shapley–Shubik power index in this context. The ﬁrst version of the Banzhaf power index
was introduced by Banzhaf in [6]; an alternative deﬁnition was later proposed by Dubey and Shapley [11]. The deﬁnition
given in [11] has a direct probabilistic interpretation, while for Banzhaf’s original deﬁnition this is not the case. The index
proposed in [6] is now known as the normalized Banzhaf index, as it rescales the players indices (as deﬁned in [11]) so that
they sum up to 1. Felsenthal and Machover [21] provide a persuasive argument against using the normalized version of the
Banzhaf index; therefore, in this paper we use the deﬁnition of Dubey and Shapley.
Both power indices have been thoroughly studied and are considered standard tools [39]. Their practical applications
include analyzing the voting structures of the European Union Council of Ministers and the IMF [33,29]. Computational
complexity of power indices is also quite well understood: while computing both indices is #P-hard [37,10,35,16], they can
be computed in polynomial time when all weights are at most polynomial in the number of players [34], and several papers
(e.g., [19,4]) discuss ways to approximate them. Some of these algorithms work well in practice and thus justify the use of
power indices as a practical way to estimate a player’s inﬂuence.
The effect of the choice of quota on the players’ power has been studied by Leech and Machover [30] in the context of
power distribution in the European Union. However, Leech and Machover focus on the inverse problem: namely, for each
value of the quota between 51% to 99% they determine the weights that ensure that the voting power of each country (as
measured by power indices) is proportional to its population. Further, Leech and Machover only consider a speciﬁc voting
scenario and do not investigate the algorithmic aspects of the quota selection problem.
More recently, designing weighted voting games with pre-speciﬁed values of power indices has been studied by a num-
ber of authors [3,18,1,9,26]. However, in these papers the game designer is assumed to be able to select both the weights
and the quota, whereas we assume that the players’ weights cannot be changed. Moreover, none of these papers provides a
provably polynomial-time exact algorithm for the problem they study. In more detail, Aziz et al. [3] use a generating func-
tion approach, while Kurz [26] makes use of integer linear programming; for both methods, the running time is exponential
in the worst case. The algorithm of de Keijzer et al. [9] is based on direct enumeration and is therefore exponential as
well. Fatima et al. [18] provide an approximation algorithm. Finally, Alon and Edelman [1] focus on identifying vectors that
can be approximated by normalized Banzhaf vectors (i.e., vectors of normalized Banzhaf indices) of weighted voting games.
Another related question is whether one can build a game with a target power distribution by combining several weighted
voting games: this issue was investigated by Faliszewski et al. [13].
A number of papers [2,27,38] consider manipulation by voters in weighted voting games, namely, splitting the weight
between two or more identities, as well as merging and annexation. In contrast with our work, all these papers assume
that, despite the changes in the number of players, the quota always remains ﬁxed. Another form of manipulation that may
be available to a voter in a weighted voting game is to declare a conﬂict with another voter, i.e., to refuse to be in the
same coalition with him. Kilgour [25] demonstrates that such manipulation may increase the Shapley value of both voters;
Brams [8] shows that this remains true for the Banzhaf index.
Computational aspects of various forms of dishonest behavior in voting with m alternatives received a lot of attention
in recent years: see [15,17,14] for surveys of this stream of research. Speciﬁcally, this research considers manipulation (dis-
honest behavior by the voters), control (dishonest behavior by the election authority), and bribery (dishonest behavior by an
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results for the model with m alternatives cannot be directly applied to our setting.
2. Preliminaries and notation
A transferable utility game G = (I, v) is given by a ﬁnite set of players I and a function v : 2I → R; the function v is
called the characteristic function of the game G . A coalition is a subset of players S ⊆ I; the set I of all players is called
the grand coalition. A transferable utility game G is said to be simple if v only takes values in {0,1}, i.e., v(S) ∈ {0,1} for
every coalition S ⊆ I , and, moreover, v(S) = 1 implies v(S ′) = 1 for every coalition S ′ such that S ⊆ S ′ . In a simple game
G = (I, v), a coalition S ⊆ I is said to be winning if v(S) = 1 and losing otherwise. A weighted voting game is a simple
game that can be described by a weight vector w = (w1, . . . ,wn) ∈ Rn+ and a quota q ∈ R+: a coalition S is winning if its
total weight meets or exceeds the quota, i.e.,
∑
i∈S wi  q, and losing otherwise; we write G = [I;w;q]. When discussing
weighted voting games, we use the terms “players”, “agents” and “voters” interchangeably.
Given a weighted voting game G , we say that an agent i ∈ S is pivotal for a coalition S if v(S) = 1 and v(S \ {i}) = 0;
similarly, i contributes to S if v(S) = 0, v(S ∪{i}) = 1. A player i is called a dummy if he does not contribute to any coalition,
i.e., for every S ⊆ I we have v(S∪{i}) = v(S). Two players i and j are said to be symmetric if v(S∪{i}) = v(S∪{ j}) for every
S ⊆ I \ {i, j}; note that if wi = w j then i and j are symmetric, but the converse is not always true. We denote by w(S) the
total weight of a coalition S , i.e., w(S) =∑i∈S wi . Unless explicitly speciﬁed otherwise, we assume that 0 < w1  · · · wn
and that 0 < q w(I). It is easy to see that this does not affect the generality of our results.
Though weighted voting games are usually deﬁned for arbitrary positive real weights, it is well-known [42] that for
every weighted voting game G = [I;w;q] there exists a game G ′ = [I;w ′;q′] with w ′ ∈ Nn , q′ ∈ N such that for every S ⊆ I
it holds that w(S)  q if and only if w ′(S)  q′ . Moreover, it can be assumed that each w ′i , i = 1, . . . ,n, and q′ can be
expressed using poly(n) bits. Thus, in what follows we assume that all weights and the quota are positive integers given in
binary, i.e., each game with n players can be described using poly(n) bits.
2.1. Shapley–Shubik index and Banzhaf index
Both the Shapley–Shubik index and the Banzhaf index measure an agent’s marginal contribution to possible coalitions.
However, they differ in the underlying coalition formation scenarios: while the Shapley–Shubik index implicitly assumes
that the agents join a coalition in random order, the Banzhaf index is based on the assumption that each agent decides
whether to join a coalition independently at random. Both of these measures can be deﬁned for arbitrary transferable
utility games. However, in what follows we provide deﬁnitions that are tailored to weighted voting games.
Let Π(I) be the set of all one-to-one mappings from I to I (i.e., the set of all permutations of I); an element of Π(I) is
denoted by π . Set Sπ (i) = { j | π( j) < π(i)}: the set Sπ (i) consists of all predecessors of i in π . The Shapley–Shubik index of








Sπ (i) ∪ {i}
)− v(Sπ (i))]. (1)
In words, the Shapley–Shubik power index counts the fraction of all orderings of the agents in which agent i is pivotal for
the coalition formed by his predecessors and himself. We will occasionally abuse notation and say that an agent i is pivotal
for a permutation π if it is pivotal for the coalition Sπ (i) ∪ {i}.





v(S) − v(S \ {i})]. (2)
This index simply counts the fraction of coalitions for which agent i is pivotal.
Both of these indices have several useful properties that make them very convenient to work with. In particular, both
of them have the dummy player property, which states that the value of the index for a given player is 0 if and only if he
does not contribute to any coalition, and the symmetry property, which states that if two players are symmetric, then their
indices are equal. Also, Shapley–Shubik index (but not the Banzhaf index) has the normalization property, which means that
the sum of Shapley–Shubik indices of all players is equal to 1.2 All of these properties are easy to verify from the deﬁnitions.
Both the number of coalitions in an n-player game and the number of permutations of n players grow exponentially
with n. Therefore, computing each of the power indices directly from its deﬁnition would take superpolynomial time. More-
over, both the Shapley–Shubik index and the Banzhaf index are known to be #P-hard to compute [37,10,35,16].
To simplify notation, given a game G = [I;w;q], we will sometimes write ϕi(q) and βi(q) instead of ϕi(G) and βi(G) if
I and w are clear from the context.
2 One can deﬁne a normalized version of the Banzhaf index by setting β ′i (G) = βi(G)/(
∑
j∈I β j(G)); indeed, this is the deﬁnition given in Banzhaf’s
original paper [6]. However, the resulting index does not admit a direct probabilistic interpretation; see [21] for a discussion.
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q ∈ (0,w(I)] we have ϕi(q) = ϕi(w(I)+ 1−q), βi(q) = βi(w(I)+ 1−q) for all i ∈ I . Indeed, player i is pivotal for a coalition
S in the game [I;w;q] if and only if it is pivotal for a coalition (I \ S) ∪ {i} in the game [I;w;w(I) + 1 − q]. Similarly,
i is pivotal for a permutation π in the game [I;w;q] if and only if it is pivotal for the permutation π ′ in the game
[I;w;w(I)+ 1−q], where π ′ is obtained by reversing π . Observe also that max{q,w(I)−q+ 1} > w(I)/2. The reason why
this observation is useful is that in most realistic applications of weighted voting games the quota is usually required to
be at least half of the total weight. On the other hand, examples with small values of q are sometimes easier to construct
and describe. The argument above shows that we may focus on such examples, since the requirement q > w(I)/2 is easy to
satisfy: any example with q < w(I)/2 can be transformed into one with q > w(I)/2.
3. Upper and lower bounds for a single player
We will start this section by showing that the center can signiﬁcantly change the players’ Shapley–Shubik and Banzhaf
indices by manipulating the quota. We then proceed to quantify the worst case effects of this manipulation for all players.
We will be interested both in the ratios of the player’s powers for a given pair of quotas and in their differences.
Example 1. Consider a weighted voting game G = [I; (1,2,3);3]. In this game, player 3 is pivotal for three coalitions (namely,
{3}, {1,3} and {2,3}) and for four permutations (namely, 312, 321, 132 and 231), so we have β3(G) = 3/4, ϕ3(G) = 2/3.
Now change the quota to 1. In the resulting game G ′ = [I; (1,2,3);1], player 3 is only pivotal for the singleton coalition {3},
so we have β3(G ′) = 1/4. Similarly, player 3 is only pivotal if it appears ﬁrst in a permutation, so we have ϕ3(G ′) = 1/3.
A natural bound on manipulator’s inﬂuence is the worst-case ratio between a given player’s values of the index in the
two games corresponding to two different values of the quota. Unfortunately, as we will now show, this ratio can only be
bounded for the largest player; for all other players, it might be possible to turn them into dummies.
Theorem 2. Given a set of players I , |I| = n, there exists a weight vector w , 0 < w1  · · · wn, and quotas q,q′  w(I) such that
for i = 1, . . . ,n − 1, we have ϕi(q) = 0, ϕi(q′) = 0 and βi(q) = 0, βi(q′) = 0. On the other hand, for every weight vector w such that
0 < w1  · · · wn and every q,q′  w(I), we have ϕn(q)/ϕn(q′) n, βn(q)/βn(q′) 2n−1 , and these bounds are tight.
Proof. Set w = (1, . . . ,1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1
,n). In the game G = [I;w;1] all players have equal power, so by symmetry we have ϕi(1) = 1/n
for i = 1, . . . ,n. Moreover, each player is pivotal for exactly one coalition, so we have βi(1) = 1/2n−1. On the other hand, in
the game G ′ = [I;w;n], all the players except for the last one are dummies, so their Shapley–Shubik and Banzhaf indices
are 0, and we have ϕn(n) = 1, βn(n) = 1. Hence, ϕn(n)/ϕn(1) = n, βn(n)/βn(1) = 2n−1.
To see that the ratio ϕn(q)/ϕn(q′) cannot exceed n, observe that for every n-player weighted voting game G it holds that
1/n ϕn(G) 1, where both inequalities follow from the fact that 0 ϕi(G) ϕn(G) for all i = 1, . . . ,n and ∑ni=1 ϕi(G) = 1.
Similarly, in any weighted voting game G we have 1/2n−1  βn(G) 1, so the ratio βn(q)/βn(q′) cannot exceed 2n−1. 
The change of quota in the proof of Theorem 2 reduced some players’ voting power to 0. What if we are only allowed
to change the quota so that all index values remain positive? It turns out that even under this constraint a change in quota
can reduce a player’s Shapley–Shubik index and Banzhaf index by an exponential factor.
Example 3. Consider the weight vector w = (1,2,4, . . . ,2n−1) and quotas q = 2k − 1, k = 1, . . . ,n. For i = 1, . . . ,n, set
Si = {1, . . . , i}. When q = 2i−1 − 1, player i is pivotal for every coalition of the form X ∪ {i}, where X is a strict subset of
Si−1, i.e., for 2i−1 − 1 coalitions. However, when q = 2i − 1, i is only pivotal for a single coalition, namely, Si . Thus, for
i = 	n/2
, changing the quota from 2i−1 − 1 to 2i − 1 lowers the Banzhaf index of player i by an exponential factor.



























(i − 1)!(n − i)!
permutations. In contrast, for q = 2i − 1, player i is only pivotal if it appears after all players in Si−1, i.e., for (i − 1)!(n − i)!
permutations. For i = 	n/2
, the gap between these two quantities is exponential in n.
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different quotas, we will now give tight bounds on the worst-case difference between a given player’s index values in the
corresponding games. We ﬁrst present our result for the Shapley–Shubik index.
Theorem 4. For a set of players I , |I| = n, every weight vector w , 0 < w1  · · ·  wn, and every pair of quotas q,q′  w(I), for
i = 1, . . . ,n − 1 the absolute difference |ϕi(q) − ϕi(q′)| does not exceed 1/(n − i + 1) and this bound is tight. For player n, we have
|ϕn(q) − ϕn(q′)| 1− 1/n, and this bound is tight.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary weight vector w that satisﬁes 0 < w1  · · ·  wn and a player i, 1  i < n. We have
ϕi(I;w;q′)  0 for every q′ ∈ (0,w(I)]. On the other hand, the monotonicity of the Shapley–Shubik index implies
ϕi(I;w;q) ϕ j(I;w;q) for every j > i and every q ∈ (0,w(I)]. As ∑nk=i ϕk(I;w;q) 1, we have ϕi(I;w;q) 1/(n− i+1).
Thus, we obtain |ϕi(I;w;q) − ϕi(I;w;q′)|  1/(n − i + 1). For player n, we have ϕn(I;w;q′)  1/n, ϕn(I;w;q)  1, so
|ϕn(I;w;q) − ϕn(I;w;q′)| 1− 1/n.
To see that these bounds are tight, set w = (1,2,4, . . . ,2n−1). In the game [I;w;2k], where k ∈ {1, . . . ,n − 1}, the ﬁrst
k players are dummies, and the last n − k players have equal power, 1/(n − k). Hence, for i = 1, . . . ,n − 1, by changing the
quota from 2i to 2i−1, we change the Shapley–Shubik index of the i-th player from 0 to 1/(n− i+1), as required. For player
n, changing the quota from 2n−1 to 1 changes n’s Shapley–Shubik index from 1 to 1/n, yielding the difference 1− 1/n. 
For the Banzhaf index, the proof is somewhat more diﬃcult.
Theorem 5. For a set of players I , |I| = n, every weight vector w , 0 < w1  · · ·  wn, and every pair of quotas q,q′  w(I), for




) · 2i−n and this bound is tight. For player n, we have
|βn(q) − βn(q′)| 1− 1/2n−1 and this bound is tight.
Proof. We consider the case i < n ﬁrst. To build up intuition, we will ﬁrst describe a family of games in which our bounds
are achieved; subsequently, we will prove that these bounds hold for every weighted voting game. Let I = {1, . . . ,n} be a set
of players, ﬁx i ∈ {1, . . . ,n−1}, and let (1, . . . ,1︸ ︷︷ ︸
i−1
, i,2i, . . . ,2i︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−i
) be the vector of the players’ weights. Set q = 2i · 	n−i2 
+ i, and
q′ = 2i. For quota q, agent i contributes to a coalition exactly if this coalition contains 	n−i2 
 players of weight 2i and any




) · 2i−1 such coalitions and thus βi(q) = ( n−i	 n−i2 









Now, consider an arbitrary weighted voting game [I;w;q] with I = {1, . . . ,n}, w1  · · ·  wn , and 0 < q  w(I). Fix a
player i ∈ {1, . . . ,n−1}, and let X = {1, . . . , i−1} and Y = {i+1, . . . ,n}. Let S ⊆ 2I be the set of all the coalitions that player








Since βi(q) = |S|/2n−1 and βi(q′) 0 for every q′ ∈ (0,w(I)], this proves the theorem for i < n.
Pick Z1, Z2 ∈ S so that Z1 = Z2 and Z1 ∩ Y ⊇ Z2 ∩ Y . We claim that Z1 ∩ X = Z2 ∩ X . Indeed, suppose for the sake
of contradiction that Z1 ∩ X = Z2 ∩ X . As Z1 = Z2, it follows that Z2 ∩ Y is a strict subset of Z1 ∩ Y . On the other hand,







w j + wi  q,
a contradiction.
Now, recall that a collection of sets {Q 1, Q 2, . . . , Q } is called a chain if Q 1 ⊇ Q 2 ⊇ · · · ⊇ Q  . By Sperner’s theorem (see,
e.g., [31]), there exists a partition of Y into at most
( |Y |
	 |Y |2 

)
chains. Let P be some such partition. P induces a partition of S:
for every Z1, Z2 ∈ S , we write Z1 ∼ Z2 if Z1 ∩ Y and Z2 ∩ Y belong to the same chain in P . It is not hard to see that ∼ is
an equivalence relation on S . By the argument above, the size of each equivalence class with respect to ∼ does not exceed
2|X | . Hence,
|S|
( |Y |
	 |Y |2 

)
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with w1  · · · wn and every pair of games G = [I;w;q] and G ′ = [I;w;q′] we have |βn(G)−βn(G ′)| 1−1/2n−1. Also, we
have seen that for the weight vector w = (1, . . . ,1,n) and games G = [I;w;n] and G ′ = [I;w;1] we have βn(G)−βn(G ′) =
1− 1/2n−1. 
4. Turning a player into a dummy
Turning a given player into a dummy is a very natural goal for a central authority that strongly dislikes a particular agent,
e.g., an election authority that wants to ensure that a certain party has no inﬂuence in the parliament. One might expect
this problem to be computationally diﬃcult: indeed, it is well-known that checking whether a given player is a dummy is
coNP-complete [37,10,35]. However, it turns out that we can eﬃciently determine if there exists a value of the quota that
turns a given player into a dummy. That is, if the center’s goal is to ensure that a certain player has no power, ﬁnding a
“good” quota is easier than checking if a given quota is “good” (assuming P = NP).
Deﬁnition 6. Given a weight vector w = (w1, . . . ,wn) such that 0 < w1  w2  · · · wn and a weight w , we say that w is
essential for w if
∑t−1
i=1 wi  wt − w for all 1 t  n.
Example 7. Suppose that wi = i for i = 1, . . . ,n. Then any positive integer value of w is essential for w = (w1, . . . ,wn): for
t = 1 we have w  w1 and hence ∑0i=1 wi = 0 w1 − w , and for t  2 we have ∑t−1i=1 wi  t − 1 wt − w .
In contrast, suppose that wi = 3i for i = 1, . . . ,n. Then ∑t−1i=1 wi = 12 (3t − 3) < 3t . Thus, w is essential for w =
(w1, . . . ,wn) only if it is suﬃciently large, i.e., w  12 (3n + 3).
The next theorem justiﬁes using the term “essential” in Deﬁnition 6: A player whose weight is essential for the vector
of weights of the remaining players is never a dummy, irrespective of the choice of the quota value for the game. (Be-
fore proceeding, the reader may want to convince herself that this is true for the weighted voting games considered in
Example 7.)
Theorem 8. Let w = (w1, . . . ,wn) be a vector of weights such that 0 < w1  w2  · · · wn. A weight w is essential for w if and
only if for every q ∈ [1,w + w(I)] player n + 1 is not a dummy in the game G(q) = [I ′;w ′;q], where I ′ = {1, . . . ,n,n + 1} and
w ′ = (w1, . . . ,wn,w).
Proof. Suppose ﬁrst that w is not essential for w , i.e., w +∑t−1i=1 wi < wt for some t ∈ {1, . . . ,n}. Set q = wt . In the game
G(q), a coalition is winning if and only if it includes a player s ∈ {t, . . . ,n}, i.e., all players 1, . . . , t − 1,n+ 1 are dummies in
G(q).
Conversely, suppose that w is essential for w . Fix a t ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, and let (St1, . . . , St2t ) be a list of all subsets of {1, . . . , t},
ordered by their weight (from the smallest to the largest). We will now show that this list is suﬃciently “dense”.
Lemma 9. For every two adjacent sets Sti and S
t
i+1 in this ordering it holds that w(S
t
i+1) − w(Sti ) w.
Before we prove Lemma 9, let us show that it implies our theorem. Fix an arbitrary quota q ∈ [1,w + w(I)]. If q  w
or q > w(Sn2n ), then clearly player n + 1 is not a dummy in G(q). Now, suppose that w < q  w(Sn2n ). Since w is essential
for w , we have w1  w and hence w(Sn1) = w1 < q. Combining the inequalities w(Sn2n )  q and w(Sn1) < q, we conclude
that there exists some i ∈ {1, . . . ,2n − 1} such that w(Sni ) < q, v(Sni+1) q. By Lemma 9 we have w(Sni )+ w  w(Sni+1) q.
This means that player n+ 1 is pivotal for Sni ∪ {n+ 1} in G(q), which is exactly what we need to show. It remains to prove
Lemma 9.
Proof of Lemma 9. The lemma is proved by induction on t . Speciﬁcally, we prove that for all t = 1, . . . ,n and all x ∈
[0,∑ti=1 wi] there exists a subset S ⊆ {1, . . . , t} such that w(S) − w  x w(S).
For t = 1, consider any x ∈ [0,w1]. Since w is essential for w , we have w  w1, and hence w1 − w  x w1, so we can
set S = {1}.
Now, suppose that the lemma holds for t−1. We will show that it is also true for t . Fix an x ∈ [0,∑ti=1 wi]. We consider
three cases:
1. x wt − w . In this case, since w is essential for w , we have x∑t−1i=1 wi , so by the inductive hypothesis there exists
some S ⊆ {1, . . . , t − 1} such that w(S) − w  x w(S). Since S is also a subset of {1, . . . , t}, we are done.
2. wt − w < x wt . We can set S = {t}.
3. wt < x
∑t
i=1 wi . We have 0 < x− wt 
∑t−1
i=1 wi , so by the inductive hypothesis there exists a set S ′ ⊆ {1, . . . , t − 1}
such that w(S ′) − w  x− wt  w(S ′). Take S = S ′ ∪ {t}.
This completes the proof of the inductive step. Thus, the lemma is proved. 
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Theorem 8 yields a simple algorithm for ﬁnding a quota that makes a speciﬁc agent a dummy player.
Theorem 10. There exists a polynomial-time algorithm that, given a weight vector w = (w1, . . . ,wn) and i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, decides
whether there exists a quota q, q ∈ [1, . . . ,∑ni=1 wi], such that player i is a dummy in the game [{1, . . . ,n};w;q], and, if so, outputs
such a quota.
Proof. First, we sort the set W ′ = {w1, . . . ,wn} \ {wi} in non-decreasing order; this can be done in O (n logn) steps. Let
w ′ = (w ′1, . . . ,w ′n−1) be the resulting sorted list; the elements of w ′ satisfy w ′1  · · · w ′n−1. By Theorem 8, it remains to
check whether wi is essential for w ′ . A straightforward implementation of this check requires O (n2) arithmetic operations;
this running time can be improved to O (n) by observing that we can obtain the (t + 1)-st sum ∑tj=1 w ′j from the t-th sum∑t−1
j=1 w ′j using a single addition.
Now, if wi is essential for w ′ , Theorem 8 implies that i cannot be made a dummy. Otherwise, there exists a t ∈ {1, . . . ,n}
such that wi + ∑t−1j=1 w ′j < w ′t ; as argued in the proof of Theorem 8, setting q = w ′t ensures that i is a dummy in[{1, . . . ,n};w;q]. 
Using Theorem 10, we can easily ﬁnd a quota that minimizes the Banzhaf index of an agent (we remark, however, that
this approach does not work for the Shapley–Shubik index).
Theorem 11. There exists a polynomial-time algorithm that, given a weight vector (w1, . . . ,wn) and a player i, ﬁnds a value of the
quota that minimizes the Banzhaf index of i.
Proof. We ﬁrst use the algorithm given in the proof of Theorem 10 to check if there is a quota that makes i a dummy
player, and if so, return this quota. Otherwise, we return q = 1+∑nj=2 w j . Under q, the Banzhaf index of i is 1/2n−1, since
the only coalition it is pivotal for is the grand coalition. 
We remark that the approach to minimizing a player’s Banzhaf index that is suggested by Theorem 11 is not necessarily
practical: the quota value q = 1 + ∑nj=2 w j may be considered to be unacceptably large, and, moreover, it equalizes all
players’ power. An interesting question is how to choose a value of q from a given interval (say, between 50% and 75% of
the total weight) so as to minimize/maximize the player’s power. This question appears to be considerably more diﬃcult
and presents a promising direction for future work; some relevant empirical results can be found in Section 7.
5. Altering the relative power of two or more players
So far, we have considered the effects that a change of quota can have on the power of a single player, both in abso-
lute and in relative terms. This focus is justiﬁed when the manipulator can be assumed to be interested in increasing or
decreasing the inﬂuence of a given player, irrespective of how it affects the other players. However, the manipulator may
also want to alter the relative power of two players i and j. For instance, suppose that wi < w j , and the center prefers
player i to player j. From the monotonicity properties of both indices, it follows that for every value of the quota q we have
ϕi(q)  ϕ j(q), βi(q)  β j(q). Hence, the best that the center may hope for is to ﬁnd a value of the quota q that satisﬁes
ϕi(q) = ϕ j(q) or βi(q) = β j(q). Conversely, if the center prefers player j to player i, it may try to choose the quota so that
ϕ j(q) > ϕi(q) (respectively, β j(q) > βi(q)). It turns out that both of these objectives are easy to accomplish. On the other
hand, choosing a quota so that all players have different power is more diﬃcult.
Throughout this section, we use the following notation: given a weighted voting game G = [I;w;q], two players i, j ∈ I ,
and a set S ⊆ I such that i ∈ S , j /∈ S , we write Si, j = (S \ {i}) ∪ { j}. Similarly, given a permutation π ∈ Π(I), we denote by
π i, j the permutation obtained from π by transposing i and j.
The following proposition is the basis of many proofs in this section.
Proposition 12. Consider a weighted voting game G = [I;w;q] and two players i, j with wi  w j. We have βi(q) < β j(q) if and
only if there exists a set S ⊆ I \ { j} such that i ∈ S, i is not pivotal for S, but j is pivotal for Si, j (or, equivalently, if the set S ′ = S \ {i}
satisﬁes w(S ′ ∪ {i}) < q  w(S ′ ∪ { j})). Similarly, ϕi(q) < ϕ j(q) if and only if there exists a permutation π ∈ Π(I) such that i is not
pivotal for π , but j is pivotal for π i, j .
Before we proceed to the proof of Proposition 12, we present a small illustrative example. Let I = {1,2,3,4}, w =
(2,3,5,8) and q = 11, and consider the game G = [I;w;q]. Let i = 3, j = 4, S = {1,2,3}. We have w(S) < q, so i is not
pivotal for S . However, we have w(Si, j) = 13, w(Si, j \ { j}) = 5, so j is pivotal for S . Similarly, consider a permutation π
given by π() = . Player i is not pivotal for π , but player j is pivotal for the permutation π i, j , which is given by π i, j(1) = 1,
π i, j(2) = 2, π i, j(3) = 4, π i, j(4) = 3.
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S | j /∈ S} and S2 = S \ S1. Let f (S) = Si, j if S ∈ S1 and f (S) = S if S ∈ S2.
We claim that f is injective on S . Indeed, if S, S ′ ∈ S1 or S, S ′ ∈ S2 then clearly S = S ′ implies f (S) = f (S ′). On the
other hand, if S ∈ S1, S ′ ∈ S2, then i /∈ f (S), i ∈ f (S ′), so f (S) = f (S ′) in this case as well.
Now, consider any S ∈ S such that i is pivotal for S . We claim that j is pivotal for f (S). Indeed, if S ∈ S1, we have
w( f (S) \ { j}) = w(S)− wi < q, w( f (S)) = w(S)− wi + w j  w(S) q, and if S ∈ S2, we have w( f (S) \ { j}) = w(S)− w j 
w(S) − wi < q, w( f (S)) = w(S) q.
Thus, each set that i is pivotal for corresponds to a distinct set that j is pivotal for. Therefore, βi(q) < β j(q) if and
only if we can ﬁnd a set in S such that i is not pivotal for S , but j is pivotal for f (S). It remains to show that we can
pick this set in S1. To see this, observe that if i is not pivotal for S ∈ S2, but j is pivotal for S , we have w(S) − wi  q,
w(S) − wi − w j < w(S) − w j < q, i.e., j is also pivotal for the set S \ {i} ∈ S1.
For the Shapley–Shubik index, the proof is similar. Suppose that i is pivotal for a permutation π ∈ Π(I). It is easy to
see that j is pivotal for π i, j . Indeed, if j ∈ Sπ (i), we have i ∈ Sπ i, j ( j) and w(Sπ i, j ( j))  w(Sπ (i)) < q, w(Sπ i, j ( j) ∪ { j}) =
w(Sπ (i) ∪ {i}) q. On the other hand, if j /∈ Sπ (i), we have Sπ i, j ( j) = Sπ (i) and hence w(Sπ i, j ( j)) < q, while w(Sπ i, j ( j) ∪
{ j})  w(Sπ (i) ∪ {i})  q. Thus, the mapping g(π) = π i, j is injective and maps any permutation that i is pivotal for to a
permutation that j is pivotal for. Therefore, ϕi(q) < ϕ j(q) is and only if there is a permutation π such that i is not pivotal
for π , but j is pivotal for π i, j . 
Proposition 12 has a number of useful consequences. First, Corollary 13 allows us to restrict our attention to the Banzhaf
power index throughout this section.
Corollary 13. Given a weighted voting game G = [I;w;q] and two players i, j ∈ I we have ϕi(G) = ϕ j(G) if and only if βi(G) =
β j(G).
Proof. It wi = w j , our claim is obviously true. Thus, assume without loss of generality that w j > wi . If β j(G) > βi(G), then
by Proposition 12 there exists a set S such that i ∈ S , i is not pivotal for S , but j is pivotal for Si, j . Consider a permutation
π that places elements of S \ {i} ﬁrst, followed by i, followed by j. It is not hard to see that i is not pivotal for π , but j is
pivotal for π i, j , so the claim follows.
Conversely, suppose that ϕ j(G) > ϕi(G). By Proposition 12, there exists a permutation π such that i is not pivotal for
π , but j is pivotal for π i, j . If i precedes j in π , set S = Sπ (i) ∪ {i}. Clearly, i is not pivotal for S . On the other hand,
Si, j = Sπ (i) ∪ { j}, so j is pivotal for Si, j , and by Proposition 12 we have β j(G) > βi(G). If i appears after j in π , set
S = (Sπ (i) \ { j}) ∪ {i}. Since j is pivotal for π i, j , we have w(S) = wπ i, j ( j) < q. Hence, i is not pivotal for S . Further, we
have w(S ∪ { j}) = wπ i, j ( j) ∪ { j}  q. Since i is not pivotal for π , this implies w(Si, j) = w(Sπ (i))  q. On the other hand,
w(Si, j \ { j}) = w(S) < q. Hence, by Proposition 12 we have β j(G) > βi(G). 
Further, Proposition 12 enables us to determine the complexity of comparing the power indices of two players in the
same game.
Theorem 14. Given a weighted voting game G = [I;w;q] and two players i, j ∈ I , the problem of deciding whether β j(G) > βi(G) is
NP-complete.
Proof. It is not hard to see that this problem is NP-hard. Indeed, we have already mentioned that the problem of checking
whether a given player i in a game G = [I;w;q] is a dummy is coNP-complete [37,10,35]. We will now give a reduction
from the complement of this problem to our problem.
Given a game G = [I;w;q] with |I| = n and a player i ∈ G , we construct a new game G ′ = [I ′;w ′;q′] as follows. We set
I ′ = I ∪ {n + 1}, w ′j = 2w j for j = 1, . . . ,n, w ′n+1 = 1, and q′ = 2q. We will now argue that i is not a dummy in G if and
only if βi(G ′) > βn+1(G ′).
It is clear that player n + 1 is a dummy in G ′ and hence βn+1(G ′) = 0. To complete the proof, it remains to argue that i
is not a dummy in G if and only if βi(G ′) > 0, i.e., i is not a dummy in G ′ .
Indeed, if i is pivotal for a coalition S in G , he is also pivotal for S in G ′ . Conversely, suppose that i is pivotal for a
coalition S ′ in G ′ . If n + 1 /∈ S ′ , then clearly i is pivotal for S ′ in G as well. On the other hand, if n + 1 ∈ S ′ , then w ′(S ′) is
an odd number. Since q′ is even, this means that w ′(S ′) q′ + 1 and hence w ′(S ′ \ {n + 1}) q′ . Further, w ′(S ′ \ {i}) < q′
implies w ′((S ′ \ {n+ 1}) \ {i}) < q′ . Thus, i is pivotal for the coalition S ′ \ {n+ 1} in G ′ . Since this coalition does not contain
n + 1, by the argument above i is pivotal for S ′ \ {n + 1} in G . This completes our hardness proof.
To see that our problem is in NP, we make use of Proposition 12. Consider a game G = [I;w;q] and two players i, j ∈ I .
If wi = w j , then β j(G) = βi(G). Now, suppose that w j > wi . By Proposition 12, to check that β j(G) > βi(G), it suﬃces to
guess a set S ′ ∈ I \ {i, j} such that w(S ′ ∪ {i}) < q w(S ′ ∪ { j}). 
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a player’s index (which is known to be #P-hard), or comparing the power indices of two players in different games (see [16]
and Section 6).
Another implication of Proposition 12 is that it is easy to select a quota so as to ensure that two players with different
weights have different power.
Corollary 15. Consider a set of players I = {1, . . . ,n} and a vector of weights w = (w1, . . . ,wn) that satisﬁes w1  · · ·  wn. For
each player j there is a quota value q such that for each player i with wi < w j it holds that βi(q) < β j(q). On the other hand, there is
a quota value q′ such that for every pair of players i, j ∈ I it holds that βi(q′) = β j(q′).
Proof. Consider players i, j ∈ I with wi < w j and set q = w j . We claim that β j(q) > βi(q). Indeed, player j is pivotal
for { j}, but player i is not pivotal for { j}i, j = {i}, so our claim follows by Proposition 12. To prove our second claim, set
q′ = w2 + · · · + wn + 1. Then each player i is pivotal for exactly one coalition, namely, the grand coalition. Hence, Banzhaf
indices of all players are equal. 
In practice, ensuring that i and j have different voting power is not always suﬃcient: the center may want to set
the quota so as to maximize the difference between the power indices of the two players, i.e., ﬁnd a value of q in
argmaxq |βi(q) − β j(q)|. However, it seems likely that ﬁnding such a quota is computationally hard; proving this and/or
providing an (approximation) algorithm for this problem is an interesting direction for future work.
Corollary 15 demonstrates that the center can set the quota so that all players have the same power. However, the center
may also have the opposite goal, i.e., it may want to ﬁnd a quota such that all players with different weights have different
Shapley–Shubik indices (or Banzhaf indices). This choice can be motivated by fairness, i.e., a desire that a player with a
larger weight has strictly more inﬂuence than a player with a smaller weight. Formally, we say that q is a separating quota
for a weight vector w with respect to the Banzhaf index (respectively, the Shapley–Shubik index) if for every pair of players
i, j ∈ I with wi = w j it holds that βi(q) = β j(q) (respectively, ϕi(q) = ϕ j(q)). Note that by Corollary 13 a quota is separating
for the Banzhaf index if and only if it is separating for the Shapley–Shubik index; thus, in what follows, we will simply talk
about a separating quota without mentioning the underlying index.
Example 16. Consider a weighted voting game with I = {1,2,3,4}, w = (1,1,2,2). Suppose ﬁrst that q = 3. Clearly, player
1 is pivotal for coalitions {1,3} and {1,4}, while player 3 is pivotal for coalitions {1,3}, {2,3}, {1,2,3} and {3,4}, so
β1(q) = 1/4, β3(q) = 1/2, and, by symmetry, β2(q) = β1(q) = 1/4, β4(q) = β3(q) = 1/2. Thus, for q = 3 and all i, j ∈ I , if
wi < w j then βi(q) < β j(q). However, for q′ = 6 or q′ = 1, we have βi(q′) = 1/8, for i = 1, . . . ,4. Thus, q = 3 is a separating
quota for the weight vector w , but q = 6 and q = 1 are not.
For many weighted voting games, ﬁnding a separating quota is not diﬃcult. As an illustration, we will now prove that
for every game with the weight vector of the form w = (1, . . . ,n) for n  20 any quota between n and w(I) − n + 1 is
separating. (It is easy to see that if q  n − 1 then players n − 1 and n have equal power and thus such a quota is not
separating; the same holds for quotas larger than w(I) − n + 1.)
Proposition 17. Let n 20, and set I = {1, . . . ,n}, w = (1, . . . ,n). Then for every q ∈ {n, . . . , n(n+1)2 + 1−n}, all players in the game[I;w;q] have different Banzhaf indices.
Proof. We have argued that we can assume without loss of generality that q  w(I)/2. Thus, it suﬃces to show that
βi−1(q) = βi(q) for all i = 2, . . . ,n and all q = n, . . . , n(n+1)4 . Fix some q ∈ {n, . . . , n(n+1)4 } and i ∈ {2, . . . ,n}.
By Proposition 12, it suﬃces to construct a set S such that i ∈ S , i−1 /∈ S , and w(S) = q. There exist nonnegative integers
a,b such that q − i = a(n + 1) + b, where a  n4 , 0 b  n. Observe that there are  n2  − 1 pairs of players ( j,k) such that
w j + wk = n + 1, namely, (1,n), (2,n − 1), . . . , ( n2  − 1, 	 n2 
 + 2). We will construct the set S by picking a such pairs and
adding player i as well as one or two extra players of total weight b. We have to be careful in our selection process, as we
have to make sure that none of the selected pairs contains i, i − 1, or the extra players needed at the last step; however,
we have at most 4 players to avoid, and we need to select a n4 pairs out of  n2  − 1, so as long as n 20 this can always
be achieved. We have the following cases to consider:
1. b = 0. In this case, we simply select a pairs that do not contain i or i − 1, and then add i.
2. b = i − 1, i. In this case, we select a pairs that do not contain i, i − 1 or b, and add i and b.
3. b ∈ {i − 1, i} and b 5. In this case, we select a pairs that do not contain i, i − 1, 2 or b − 2, and add i, 2 and b − 2.
4. b ∈ {i − 1, i} and b  4. In this case, we select a − 1 pairs that do not contain i, i − 1, 5 or n + b − 5, and add i, 5 and
n + b − 5.
In all cases, we have successfully constructed a set S with the required properties, so we are done. 
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with distinct weights admit a separating quota. However, it turns out that this is not the case. We ﬁrst need the following
deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 18. A sequence of positive numbers (w1, . . . ,wn) is called super-increasing if we have
∑k−1
j=1 w j < wk for all
k = 2, . . . ,n.
Recall that if two players i and j are symmetric in a game G , i.e., v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ { j}) for every set S ⊆ I \ {i, j}, then
βi(G) = β j(G). We will now prove that for every super-increasing weight vector of length at least 3, for every value of the
quota at least two of the ﬁrst three players are symmetric, and hence there is no separating quota for every such weight
vector.
Lemma 19. For every game G = [I;w;q] with |I| 3 and a super-increasing vector of weights w = (w1, . . . ,wn), it holds that either
players 1 and 2 are symmetric, or players 2 and 3 are symmetric.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on the number of agents n. For n = 3, we have three cases to consider:
1. q w2. In this case, we have v({2}) = v({3}) = 1, v({1,2}) = v({1,3}) = 1, so players 2 and 3 are symmetric.
2. w2 < q w3+w1. In this case, we have v({1}) = v({2}) = 0, v({1,3}) = v({2,3}) = 1, so players 1 and 2 are symmetric.
3. w3 + w1 < q. In this case, we have v({2}) = v({3}) = 0, v({1,2}) = v({1,3}) = 0, so players 2 and 3 are symmetric.
For the inductive step, we assume that the claim is correct for n − 1 and prove it for n. Consider a game G = [I;w;q]
with I = {1, . . . ,n} and a super-increasing sequence of weights w = (w1, . . . ,wn).
Suppose ﬁrst that q wn . Set I ′ = I \{n}, w ′ = (w1, . . . ,wn−1), and let G ′ = (I ′;w ′;q). By the inductive hypothesis, there
exist two players i, j ∈ {1,2,3} that are symmetric in G ′ . We claim that i and j are also symmetric in G . Indeed, consider
an arbitrary coalition S ⊆ I \ {i, j}. If n /∈ S , then S ⊆ I ′ \ {i, j} and v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ { j}) by the inductive hypothesis. On the
other hand, if n ∈ S , then v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ { j}) = 1, since q wn .
Now suppose that wn < q  w(I). Set I ′ = I \ {n}, w ′ = (w1, . . . ,wn−1), and let G ′ = (I ′;w ′;q − wn). By the inductive
hypothesis, there exist two players i, j ∈ {1,2,3} that are symmetric in G ′ . We claim that i and j are also symmetric in G .
Indeed, consider an arbitrary coalition S ⊆ I \{i, j}. Since w is a super-increasing sequence, player n belongs to each winning
coalition in G . Thus, if n /∈ S , then v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ { j}) = 0. On the other hand, suppose that n ∈ S , and let S ′ = S \ {n}.
We have S ′ ⊆ I ′ \ {i, j}, so by the inductive hypothesis vG ′ (S ′ ∪ {i}) = vG ′ (S ′ ∪ { j}). Clearly, a coalition T is winning in G ′ if
and only if T ∪ {n} is winning in G . Thus, we have vG(S ∪ {i}) = vG(S ∪ { j}) in this case as well. This completes the proof of
the inductive step. Thus, the lemma is proved. 
Lemma 19 immediately implies the following result.
Theorem 20. For every game G = [I;w;q] with |I| 3 and a super-increasing vector of weights w = (w1, . . . ,wn), either β1(q) =
β2(q), or β2(q) = β3(q). Consequently, there is no separating quota for w .
Given Proposition 17 and Theorem 20, it is natural to ask if one can eﬃciently determine whether a given weight vector
admits a separating quota. Proposition 12 implies that this problem is in NP for both indices. Indeed, given a quota q and a
collection of sets S2, . . . , Sn , one can easily check whether for all values of i ∈ {2, . . . ,n} such that wi−1 < wi it holds that
(1) i is pivotal for Si and (2) i − 1 is not pivotal for Si,i−1i . However, it seems unlikely that this problem is in P; we propose
this question as a topic for future work.
6. Comparing two values of the quota
We have argued that when the center can choose any quota that she likes, some of the associated computational prob-
lems (e.g., turning a player into a dummy) become easy. However, in real-life scenarios the center may be restricted in the
choice of quota: For example, the center might be able to modify the quota only very slightly or have a choice of only
several quota values. We will now show that the problem of deciding which of two given quotas is more favorable to a
particular player is computationally hard, even if the quotas differ only by 1.
Deﬁnition 21. Given a power index f , the Quota f problem is deﬁned as follows. We are given a set of players I , |I| = n,
a vector of weights w = (w1, . . . ,wn), two quota values, q′ and q′′ , and an index i ∈ I . Let G ′ = [I;w;q′], G ′′ = [I;w;q′′].
The goal is to decide whether f i(G ′) > f i(G ′′).
The notion of hardness that we will make use of is PP-hardness. The class PP (see, e.g., [36]) captures the notion of
probabilistic polynomial-time computation. The idea is that one can look at nondeterministic computations in terms of
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step we can toss a coin to choose the next move uniformly at random from the set of possible ones, as deﬁned by N ’s
transition relation. Thus, we can naturally deﬁne the probability of the event that N accepts a string x. Formally, we say
that a language L belongs to PP if there exists an NP machine N such that x ∈ L if and only if the probability that N accepts
x is at least 12 .
PP is a surprisingly powerful class. For example, NP ⊆ PP, and, moreover, PP contains the class Θ p2 (also known as
PNP[log]) of all decision problems that can be solved via parallel access to NP (see [7]). Used as an oracle, PP is essentially as
powerful as #P [5]; in fact, #P can be viewed as a functional counterpart of PP.3
There are many natural PP-complete problems. In particular, Faliszewski and Hemaspaandra [16] recently studied the
following one.
Deﬁnition 22. (See [16].) Given a power index f , the PowerCompare f problem is deﬁned as follows. We are given two
weighted voting games, G ′ and G ′′ , a player i in G ′ , and a player j in G ′′ . The goal is to decide whether f i(G ′) > f j(G ′′).
Faliszewski and Hemaspaandra show that this problem is PP-complete both for the Shapley–Shubik power index and
for the Banzhaf power index. Effectively, they give a reduction from Sat-Compare, the problem of deciding, given two
propositional formulas, x and y, if #Sat(x) > #Sat(y), where #Sat(x) is the function that takes as input a propositional
formula x and returns the number of satisfying truth assignments for x.4
Faliszewski and Hemaspaandra’s proof proceeds by giving a reduction from Sat-Compare to SubsetSum-Compare. Recall
that an instance of Subset Sum (see [23]) is a sequence of nonnegative integers [x1, . . . , xm; tx]; a solution to this instance is
a subset of indices S ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} such that ∑i∈S xi = tx . #SubsetSum(X) is a #P function that takes as input an instance of
Subset Sum and returns the number of solutions to that instance. SubsetSum-Compare is deﬁned similarly to Sat-Compare,
i.e., it compares the number of solutions to two instances of this problem.
As Quota f is a simple special case of PowerCompare f , the result of Faliszewski and Hemaspaandra immediately implies
that Quota f is in PP both for f = ϕ and for f = β . To show that Quota f is PP-hard for f ∈ {ϕ,β}, rather than using the
result of Faliszewski and Hemaspaandra as a black box, we make use of a technical lemma proved in their paper, which
provides a reduction from Sat-Compare to SubsetSum-Compare that has several useful properties. We then show that an
instance of SubsetSum-Compare output by this reduction can be transformed into an instance of Quota f for f ∈ {ϕ,β}, so
that a “yes”-instance of the former problem becomes a “yes”-instance of the latter problem and vice versa.
The following lemma is a corollary to the reduction used in [16].
Lemma 23. (See [16].) Given two propositional formulas, x and y, one can compute in polynomial time two instances of the Subset
Sum problem, X = [x1, . . . , xm, tx] and Y = [y1, . . . , ym, t y] such that #Sat(x) = #SubsetSum(X), #Sat(y) = #SubsetSum(Y ). In
addition, there is a nonnegative integer k such that: (1) any solution to X has exactly k elements, and (2) any solution to Y has exactly
k elements.
We are now ready to prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 24. Quotaϕ and Quotaβ are PP-complete. This holds even if we stipulate that |q′ − q′′| = 1.
Proof. Membership in PP is clear, and thus we focus on proving PP-hardness. We give the proof for ϕ; for β , we can use
the same reduction and its proof of correctness is analogous (and easier).
We give a reduction from Sat-Compare. Let x and y be two propositional formulas. We ﬁrst compute two instances of
SubsetSum, X = [x1, . . . , xm; tx] and Y = [y1, . . . , ym; t y], as described in Lemma 23. We have #Sat(x) = #SubsetSum(X),
#Sat(y) = #SubsetSum(Y ), and for every solution S ′ to X and every solution S ′′ to Y it holds that |S ′| = |S ′′| = k for some
integer k.
Let K be the smallest power of 2 greater than 16 · (∑mi=1 xi + tx) + 1. We form a sequence of weights w =[w1, . . . ,w2m+2,w2m+3] as follows:
1. For each i = 1, . . . ,m, we set wi = 16xi , wm+i = K yi .
2. We set w2m+1 = Kty + 4, w2m+2 = 16tx + 5, w2m+3 = 1.
3 Brieﬂy put, a function f belongs to #P if there is an NP machine N such that for each input string x, N has exactly f (x) accepting computation paths
on input x. We point the readers to [36] for more details.
4 Strictly speaking, Faliszewski and Hemaspaandra used problem X3C (see [23]) and its counting variant #X3C. However, there exist parsimonious reduc-
tions (i.e., reductions that preserve the number of solutions) between #Sat and #X3C: the reduction from #Sat to # X3C is given in [24], and the other
reduction is standard. Therefore, the results and lemmas of Faliszewski and Hemaspaandra can be phrased in terms of #Sat as well.
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q′ = q and q′′ = q + 1, and player i = 2m + 3. It is easy to see that the reduction works in polynomial time, and it remains
to show that it is correct.
Let us form two games, G ′ = [I,w,q′] and G ′′ = [I,w,q′′]. Our games have three special players, p = 2m+ 3 (the player
whose power index we are interested in), f ′ = 2m+ 1 (ﬁller player for G ′), and f ′′ = 2m+ 2 (ﬁller player for G ′′). We claim
that ϕp(G ′) > ϕp(G ′′) if and only if #SubsetSum(X) > #SubsetSum(Y ), or, equivalently, #Sat(x) > #Sat(y).
Let us ﬁrst consider ϕp(G ′) and a permutation π for which p is pivotal. Since wp = 1, we have w(Sπ (p)) = Kty +
16tx + 4. Thus, it is easy to see that in π player p is preceded by f ′ , but not by f ′′: otherwise, it would not be the case
that w(Sπ (p)) = 4 mod 16. We have w(Sπ (p) \ { f ′}) = 16tx , and it is easy to see that there is a one-to-one correspondence




)= k!(2m + 2− k)!
(2m + 3)! #SubsetSum(X) =
k!(2m + 2− k)!
(2m + 3)! #Sat(x).
Now, consider ϕp(G ′′). Let π be a permutation of I such that p is pivotal for π . This means that the players preceding
p have total weight Kty + 16tx + 5. As in the previous paragraph, it is easy to see that in π player p is preceded by f ′′ ,
but not by f ′: otherwise, it would not be the case that w(Sπ (p)) = 5 mod 16. Hence, there is a one-to-one correspondence




)= k!(2m + 2− k)!
(2m + 3)! #SubsetSum(Y ) =
k!(2m + 2− k)!
(2m + 3)! #Sat(y).
As a result, ϕp(G ′) > ϕp(G ′′) if and only if #Sat(x) > #Sat(y). This proves that our reduction is correct. 
We remark that this hardness result shows that computational complexity can be a barrier to manipulation by the central
authority, as it implies that it will be diﬃcult for the center to choose the quota so as to obtain the desired result. Moreover,
as PP is a more powerful complexity class than NP, and our problem is complete for it, the manipulators will not be able to
use the existing heuristics for problems in NP. However, PP-hardness does not necessarily imply that the problem is hard on
average; determining whether manipulating the quota is hard in this sense is an interesting open problem. We would also
like to remark that, even though power indices themselves are hard to compute, a hardness of manipulation result is still
signiﬁcant: power indices reﬂect the distribution of power among the agents, and the center may want to manipulate this
distribution even if it cannot compute it.
On the ﬂip side, it is known [34] that both the Shapley–Shubik and the Banzhaf index are easy to compute if the
weights are polynomially bounded (or, equivalently, given in unary). Clearly, these algorithms can be used to solve Quotaϕ
and Quotaβ , as we can directly compute the values of a player’s power index for both quotas, and choose the quota that
gives us a better outcome. Hence, computational complexity alone does not provide adequate protection from this form of
manipulation, and other approaches are needed.
7. Small perturbations: an empirical analysis
In the previous section, we considered the situation where the center has to choose between two permissible values of
the quota. However, it may also happen that the center can choose from a much larger set of quotas, namely, all quotas
that differ from the current one by a small amount. For example, consider weighted voting in political decision-making
bodies [33]. It may be fairly easy to change the quota from 60% of the votes to anywhere between 51% and 66% of the
votes, but changing the quota to 80% of all votes would be considerably more diﬃcult. Analyzing this form of manipulation
is a challenging problem, and we were not able to derive analytical bounds on the manipulator’s power in this setting.
Therefore, in this section we provide an empirical study of the effects of the maximal magnitude of the perturbation on the
center’s ability to change the power of a target player.
We ﬁrst brieﬂy describe our simulation system, the game construction and the power index calculations, and then
present the empirical results obtained.
7.1. Simulation system and settings
Our simulation system creates weighted voting games by ﬁrst choosing the number of players in the game, uniformly
at random from a given interval of positive integers. Then, the system draws the weight of each player independently from
N(μ,σ 2) (the normal distribution with mean μ and variance σ 2). To speed up calculations, the weights are rounded to the
nearest integer. Given a weight vector w = (w1, . . . ,wn), we set w =∑ni=1 wi . The quota for the game is chosen uniformly
at random between 0 and w and rounded to the nearest integer.
In our experiments, we have used a mean of μ = 200 and standard deviation σ = 30. The number of players was
chosen uniformly at random from the set {6,7, . . . ,25}, and the target player is chosen uniformly among all players in the
game. Having generated a game G , we construct a number of perturbed games G ′1, . . . ,G ′k (each with a different quota),
and test whether (and by how much) the power of a target agent has increased in the perturbed game. Such tests require
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to compute, we have applied the approximation method of Bachrach et al. [4], and used the Shapley–Shubik power index
in our experiments.
The algorithm of Bachrach et al. estimates the power indices and returns a result which is probably approximately correct.
Formally, given a game in which a player’s true power index is φ, and given a target accuracy level 
 and conﬁdence level δ,
the algorithm returns an approximation φ̂ such that with probability at least 1 − δ we have |φ − φ̂|  
 (i.e. the result is
likely to be close to the correct value). To achieve a conﬁdence level δ and accuracy level 
 , this algorithm chooses s = ln 2δ
2
2
random permutations of the agents, and measures the fraction of these permutations where the agent is pivotal. Thus, the
total running time is logarithmic in the conﬁdence δ and quadratic in the accuracy 
 , so the approach is tractable even for
high accuracy and conﬁdence. We have used δ = 0.00001 and 
 = 0.001, so the power was estimated very accurately.
Our simulation system was written using C# and Microsoft SQL database. Every single generated game required com-
puting many power indices—one per each quota tried. Due to the massive amount of simulated games and the number of
computed power indices, we have used a computer cluster with 250 cores for our experiments.
We will now describe our experimental setup in more detail. Our goal is to understand how the manipulator’s ability to
change a player’s power depends on the permitted changes to the quota. The manipulator may be constrained in two ways:
(1) he may be allowed to raise the quota, but not to lower it, or vice versa, and (2) he may be allowed to only change the
quota by a certain amount (say, 20%). Any such set of constraints determines an interval of permissible quotas. Given such
an interval, we try to identify the best value of the quota from the manipulator’s perspective; of course, the answer depends
on whether the manipulator wants to increase or decrease the target player’s power. To present the results, we group them
according to the manipulator’s intentions (helping or hurting a player) and the change direction (raising or lowering the
quota); given these choices, we graph the change in the target player’s power that can be accomplished by the manipulator
as a function of the permissible quota range.
We will describe our algorithm for the case where we are only allowed to lower the quota; the algorithm for raising
the quota is similar. The most important parameter in our experiments is the maximum allowed perturbation magnitude θ .
For a given value of θ and a weighted voting game [I;w;q], we are interested in the changes in target player’s power that
can be achieved by choosing the quota q′ so that 0 q−q
′
q  θ (for quota-raising manipulation, we consider quotas q′ that
satisfy 0  q
′−q
q  θ ). We employ a very simple algorithm to search for a good quota in this range. Given an additional
parameter c, our algorithm determines the minimal quota qb = q(1− θ) that the center may set, and simply tries c different
possible quotas in constant intervals between qb and q. In other words, denoting d = qθc , the algorithm tries the quotas
Q = {qb,qb +d,qb +2d, . . . ,qb + (c−1)d}. For each quota q′ ∈ Q , it approximates the power index of the target player using
the method of Bachrach et al. [4], and keeps track of the optimal manipulation found. We remark that our algorithm only
tries some of the possible values of the quota, so it may fail to ﬁnd an optimal manipulation in the allowed quota range.
Thus, it may underestimate the power of the manipulator. However, our experiments show that even this very simple
algorithm is usually successful in ﬁnding a beneﬁcial manipulation.
7.2. Empirical results
Our empirical results considered many randomly constructed games. For each such game, we use the algorithm described
above to ﬁnd the optimal manipulation for different maximal perturbation magnitudes. The experiments described below
consider both raising and lowering the quota, and both increasing and decreasing the power of a target player.
The following results consider the relationship between the maximal allowed perturbation magnitude θ , and the optimal
change in the power of a target player. For each game, we have considered different values of θ , and used the algorithm
described above to ﬁnd the optimal quota manipulation in the allowed range. The following ﬁgures show the relation
between the value of θ and the proportional change in power, averaged across many experiments. Note that we have
considered the proportional change in the target agent’s power (rather than the power change in absolute terms).
Fig. 1 shows the average power increase that can be achieved by lowering the quota. It shows that on average (for the
games generated as described in Section 7.1), even moderate values of θ such as θ = 20% can result in an increase of 15%
in an agent’s power. On the other hand, the curve saturates quite quickly, and for θ = 70% the power of the target agent
can only be increased by 25%. Despite an increase in the curve’s slope starting at θ = 70%, even for very large values of θ ,
which allow decreasing the quota to almost zero, on average it is only possible to increase an agents power by roughly 40%.
Similarly, Fig. 2 shows the average power decrease that can be achieved by lowering the quota. The shape of the curve
is similar to that in Fig. 1. Again, even for perturbation magnitudes of almost 100%, which can decrease the quota to almost
zero, on average it is only possible to decrease an agent’s power by about 40%.
Figs. 3 and 4 consider raising the quota to change the power of a target agent. Fig. 4 shows the average power change
achieved when raising the quota to increase the target agent’s power. The shape of the curve shows that while small quota
perturbations may affect the target player’s power relatively strongly, the curve saturates quickly. In particular, although
setting θ = 25% allows increasing the power by over 15%, setting θ = 100% yields an average power increase of only 20%.
Note that for the case of increasing the quota, it is possible to use perturbation magnitudes that exceed 100%. However, we
do not allow quotas that exceed the total weight. Thus, results for high perturbation magnitudes should be treated more
carefully. For instance, if the graph shows that setting θ = 400% allows increasing an agent’s power by 35% on average, this
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means that this is the average for all games where such a perturbation would still result in a quota that does not exceed
the total weight. In other words, for each value of θ > 100% the results are displayed contingent on the quota not exceeding
the sum of the weights.
Fig. 4 considers increasing the quota to decrease the target agent’s power. Similarly to Fig. 3, the curve saturates quickly.
Fig. 5 considers the effect of the number of agents in a randomly generated weighted voting game on the achieved
power change (for different values of θ ). It considers lowering the quota in order to increase the power of the target agent
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Fig. 4. Average achieved power decrease for different perturbation magnitudes (raising the quota).
(similarly to Fig. 1), for different numbers of agents in the generated game. The results show that although the general
shape of the curve is quite similar across different numbers of players, quota manipulations are more effective when there
are fewer players in the game. For example, for θ = 70%, on average our algorithm achieves a 40% power increase when
the number of players is between 6 and 10, but only achieves a 10% power increase on average when there are 21 to 25
players. One possible explanation for this is that when there are more players in the game, it is more likely that there are
several “competing” players with weights similar to the target player’s weight, who also gain from quota manipulations.
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Fig. 6 shows a histogram of the achieved power increase across the experiments. The histogram shows which power
increase values are more likely to be achieved by our algorithm (for a speciﬁc value of θ ). To generate the ﬁgure, we
have used θ = 50%. We have partitioned the experiments into buckets according to the optimal proportional power change
uncovered by our algorithm. The ﬁrst bucket contained experiments where the power change was between 5% and 6%, the
second bucket contained experiments where the power change was between 6% and 7% and so on, until the last bucket,
which contained experiments where the power change was between 84% and 85%. We have then counted the number of
experiments in each bucket, ni being the number of experiments for bucket i, and normalized by
∑
i ni , the total number of
experiments, so the frequency of bucket j is f j = n j∑
i ni
. The X-axis shows the buckets and the Y-axis shows the frequencies
of these buckets. Fig. 6 shows that games where the optimal power increase (achievable by our algorithm for θ = 50%)
is low are more common than games where the power increase is high. This indicates that even signiﬁcant changes of
the quota, such as θ = 50% are not very likely to trigger massive changes in a target agent power. Yet, our results show
that certainly players can gain (or lose) nonnegligible amounts of power by altering the quota. This holds even under
signiﬁcant restrictions on the magnitude of the quota perturbation, and even when using a very simple algorithm to ﬁnd
quota manipulations. Thus, such manipulations present a real danger for practical applications of weighted voting.
8. Conclusion
We have considered quota manipulations in weighted voting games, i.e., situations where the central authority sets the
game’s quota to suit its purposes. We have argued that the central authority can affect the agents’ power signiﬁcantly by
choosing a suitable quota and quantiﬁed the possible effect of such manipulations. We have given an eﬃcient procedure
for testing whether there exists a quota that makes a given player a dummy. Further, we have discussed the problem of
ﬁnding a quota that ensures that some or all players have different power. Also, we have shown that checking which of two
possible quota values makes a certain agent more powerful is PP-complete.
We have also provided empirical results regarding quota manipulations in situations where the center is only allowed
to perturb the quota within certain limits. We have quantiﬁed the expected change in power the center can achieve using
a simple quota manipulation algorithm for various possible manipulation magnitudes. Also, we have examined the effect of
the number of players on the changes in players’ power achievable by quota manipulations.
Several directions remain open for further research. The most immediate one is deriving analytical bounds on the manip-
ulator’s power in settings where the manipulator has to select the quota from a certain range. Another interesting question
is how should the manipulator pick a quota in order to maximize the difference between two players’ power. More broadly,
since manipulations by changing the quota are possible in weighted voting games, what measures can be taken against
such manipulations? Are there restricted domains where there is a polynomial-time algorithm for checking which quota
18 M. Zuckerman et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 180–181 (2012) 1–19Fig. 6. Histogram of achieved power increase.
makes a certain agent more powerful than another agent? Are there other interesting domains where such manipulations
are possible?
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